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COMMENTS
SNATCHING LEGISLATIVE POWER: THE
JUSTICE DEPARTMENT'S REFUSAL
TO ENFORCE THE PARENTAL
KIDNAPPING PREVENTION ACT
"Child snatching" is the illegal abduction of a child by the noncustodial parent or agent of such parent from the parent or guardian who
has lawful custody or control over the child.' Between 25,000 and
100,000 children may be the victims of interstate child snatching each
year.2 Only about ten percent of the custodial parents ever locate their
abducted children. 3 The parent who abducts the child hopes either to
I Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act of 1979" Joint Hearings on S 105 Before the Subcomm. on
CriminalJustice of the Comm. of theJudiciay and Subcomm. on Child and Human Development ofthe
Comm. on Labor and Human Resources, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 40 (1980) (statement of Senator
David Durenberger) [hereinafter cited as Kidnapping Hearings]. This Comment uses the
phrases "child snatching," "child stealing," and "parental kidnapping" synonymously to refer
to the act of abducting or concealing a child by a noncustodial parent or guardian in contravention of a court order. The term "custodial parent" hereinafter refers to the parent granted
custody by judicial decree and not to the parent with physical possession of the child.
2 Estimates of the number of children annually kidnapped by one of the parents range
from 25,000 to 100,000. Compare Note, Prevention of Child Snatching.- The Needfor a National
Polfiz,
11 Loy. L.A.L. REv. 829, 830 (1978) (estimating that from 25,000 to 100,000 children
are kidnapped annually) with Pick, Kidnapped!, 9 STUDENT LAW., Oct. 1980, at 28 (estimating
that upwards from 100,000 are kidnapped annually). The Library of Congress estimates that
25,000 snatchings occur annually. President Arnold Miller of Children's Rights, Inc., an organization dedicated to preventing child snatching, believes the number may be closer to
100,000. Wallop, Children ofDivorce and Separation, 15 TRIAL, May 1979, at 34, 35. The National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, in a survey regarding the child
stealing problem, found that "the 'rule of seize and run' is indeed rampant throughout the
country.
Bordenheimer, The Uniform Child Cuslod JurisdictionAct: A Legislative Remedyfor
Children Caught in the Conflict ofLaws, 22 VAND. L. REv. 1207, 1216 (1969).
3 Examination ofthe Problem of "Child Snatching" Hearings on S 105 Before the Subcomm. on
Child andHuman Development ofthe Senate Comm. on Laborand Human Resources, 96th Cong., Ist
Sess. 1 (1979) (statement of Senator Alan Cranston) [hereinafter cited as ChildSnatching Hearings]. Dr. Doris Jonas Freed, Chairperson of the American Bar Association's Family Law
Section Child Custody Committee and a member of the National Task Force of the A.B.A.'s
Child Custody Project, also reported that out of every ten abducted children, six or seven are
never seen again by the parent. Hearing on H.R. 1290 Before the Subcomm. on Crime ofthe House
Comm. oftheJudiciar, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 104 (1980), [hereinafter cited as Hearing on H.R.
1290.
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remain permanently hidden from the custodial parent or to obtain legal
custody of the child through a decree from another state. Until recently,
most state courts would not apply the full faith and credit doctrine4 to
custodial decrees and they frequently modified the custodial decrees of
courts from other states. The judicial willingness to modify custodial
decrees of sister states has encouraged child snatching by providing the
noncustodial parent with an incentive to take the child to a jurisdiction
that might grant a more favorable decree.
Child psychologists agree that child snatching induces fear, guilt,
and anger in children and, in many cases, results in irreversible psychological damage. 5 Furthermore, the parent from whom the noncustodial
parent snatched the child is also a victim and frequently suffers anguish
from not knowing the location or health of the child. The custodial
parent also may incur substantial costs in an effort to locate the missing
child. 6 The significant personal, economic, and social costs of the growing 7 problem of child snatching, as well as the lack of a uniform judicial
approach to custody decrees, have prompted state and federal legislatures to take measures to combat child snatching.
On December 28, 1980, President Carter signed into law the Paren4 U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1 declares:
Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to the public Act, Records, and
Judicial Proceedings of every other State. And the Congress may by general Laws prescribe the Manner in which such Acts, Records and Proceedings shall be proved, and the
Effect thereof. By statute Congress has provided that judgements shall have the same full
faith and credit in every court within the United States and its Territories and Possessions as they have by law or usage in the courts of such State, Territory or Possession
from which they are taken.
5 Psychiatrist Ner Litmer states that between 10% and 40% of kidnap victims become
seriously disturbed. Their symptoms include sleeplessness, bedwetting, fear of strangers, and
regression to infantile behavior. The statement of one adult who was kidnapped and recovered 20 years ago shows the permanent effect of such kidnapping: "After the trauma of the
kidnapping and the trauma of recovery, you are never all right again. I still have a daily
nightmare about it." 126 CoNG. REC. S 11,489 (daily ed. Aug. 25, 1980). Jennette Minkoff, a
Rochester clinical psychologist, has seen many victims of child snatching. She rates the
child's long term injury as
often severe, often irreversible and sometimes irreparable. These kids display a distrust of both parents. Upon returning home they fall into a depression and become fearful. They're constantly looking over their shoulders to see if they'll be snatched again.
Years later, even after long periods of therapy, they have flashbacks and nightmares; I
have never talked to anyone who cannot remember the agonies of the experience.
Pick, supra note 2, at 35.
6 Some parents report spending up to $20,000 in their efforts to locate their missing child.
Hearingon HR. 1290, supra note 3, at 17 (statement of Arnold Miller, President of Children's
Rights Inc.).
7 The increase of child snatching correlates to the escalating divorce rate and the increasing mobility of American society. Fleck, Child Snatchng:. What Legal Remediesfor "Flee and
Plea'?, 55 CHI.[-]KENT L. Rev. 303 (1979); Wallop, supra note 2, at 34.
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tal Kidnapping Prevention Act.8 The purposes of the act are: (1) to
deter child snatching; (2) to provide federal assistance in locating
snatched children; and (3) to promote cooperation and uniformity
among the states concerning their treatment of child custody decrees. 9
Severe resistance from the United States Department of Justice has,
however, prevented the accomplishment of these goals. Recently issued
Justice Department regulations burden the parents who request governmental assistance with requirements they must satisfy before they can
obtain any federal assistance. 10 These requirements blatantly contravene congressional intent regarding the purposes of the Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act.
This Comment scrutinizes three facets of the child snatching problem. First, the Comment examines the legislative history of the Parental
Kidnapping Prevention Act to determine how the Act's drafters hoped
to solve the problem of child snatching and how the Justice Department
regulations emasculate the Act's impact. Second, this Comment discusses whether the Justice Department's refusal to implement the Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act in the form Congress passed is a
legitimate exercise of administrative agency discretion. Finally, this
Comment suggests measures that could eliminate the adverse effects of
the Justice Department's regulations and produce a more effective federal child snatching law.
I.

A

JUDICIALLY CREATED DILEMMA

When parents of a child are unable to settle amicably a dispute
concerning the custody of their child, courts provide the forum for resolution of the dispute. Courts typically will issue a decree giving legal
custody of a child to one of the parents. I The court usually bases the
custody decree upon the "best interests of the child."'1 2 In determining
the child's best interests, courts consider a wide range of factors such as
the moral fitness of the parents, the comparative physical environments
offered by the parties, and the emotional ties of the child to each of the
parents. 13 An unfortunate consequence of many custody decrees is the
8 Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-611, 94 Stat. 3566 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C., 28 U.S.C. & 42 U.S.C.).
9 Id. § 7(c), 94 Stat. 3568.
10 U.S. JusT. DEP'T, UNITED STATES ATTORNEY MANUAL 9-69.421 (1981).

t See Note, Alternative to "ParentalRight" in Child Custod Disputes Involving Third Parties, 73
YALE LJ. 151 (1963).
12 The "best interests of the child" doctrine is applied in the majority of child custody
cases. Occasionally, however, courts apply the parental rights doctrine that a biological parent is entitled to custody of the child unless it is shown that he is unfit. Evidence that the
parent abandoned or abused the child may show the requisite unfitness. Id. at 153.
13 Id.
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dissatisfaction of the parent who does not obtain legal custody of the
child. Frustrated by limited or nonexistent visitation rights, the noncustodial parent often resorts to the self-help tactic of stealing the child
from the custodial parent and fleeing from the jurisdiction that rendered
the custody decree.
The refusal of the United States Supreme Court to apply the full
faith and credit doctrine to a child custody decree in New York ex rel
Halve v. Halve1 ' 4 helped to create today's serious child snatching problem. 15 In Halvey, a Florida state court awarded a mother custody of her
child. Nonetheless, the father took the child to New York and successfully petitioned a New York court to modify the Florida custody decree
in his favor. In upholding the modification of the Florida decree, the
Supreme Court declared:
Whatever may be the authority of a State to undermine a judgment of a
sister State on grounds not cognizable in the State where the judgment was
rendered, it is clear that the State of the forum has at least as much leeway
to disregard the judgment, to6 qualify it, or to depart from it as does the
State where it was rendered.'
The decision sought to protect the best interests of the child by permitting the continual modification of a child custody decree as the circumstances of a child's life changed.1 7 In retrospect, however, the Halvey
decision provided a strong incentive for noncustodial parents to take
their children from the custodial parents to a state that would grant the
abducting parent a more favorable custody decison.' 8
14 330 U.S. 610 (1947).
15 For a more detailed examination of the Supreme Court's treatment of child custody
decrees, see Fleck, supra note 8, at 304; Note, Famil' Law. Court's Adoption of Uniform Child
Custody Jurisdiction Act O rs Little Hope of Resolving Child Custody Conflicts, 60 MINN. L. REV.
820, 824 (1976).
16 330 U.S. at 615.
17 Id.
18 In three child custody decisions after Halve v. Halvey, the Supreme Court avoided applying the full faith and credit doctrine to child custody litigation. Ford v. Ford, 371 U.S.
187 (1962); Kovacs v. Brewer, 356 U.S. 604 (1958); May v. Anderson, 345 U.S. 528 (1953). As
a result, the Court provided little guidance for those who had to make interstate child custody
decisions. Justice Jackson, commenting on this lack of guidance in a dissenting opinion, accurately stated that "a state of the law such as this, where possession apparently is not merely
nine points of the law but all of them and self-help the ultimate authority, has little to commend it in logic or as a principle of order in a federal system." May v. Anderson, 345 U.S. at
539 (Jackson, J., dissenting).
The brevity of the Supreme Court's decisions has led to a severe lack of uniformity and
cooperation among the states concerning custody decrees. H. CLARK, LAW OF DoMESTIc
RELATIONS 320 (1968). For example, it is not unusual for a court in one state to award
custody to the mother in one action while another state gives the father custody. See Sharpe
v. Sharpe, 77 Ill. App. 2d 298, 222 N.E.2d 340 (1966); Mariz v. Mariz, 142 Cal. App. 2d 527,
298 P.2d 710 (1956); Stoute v. Pate, 209 Ga. 786, 75 S.E.2d 748 (1953), cert. denied, 347 U.S.
968 (1954); Stoute v. Pate, 120 Cal. App. 2d 699, 261 P.2d 788 (1953), cert. denied, 347 U.S.
968 (1954). In situtations like this the litigants do not know which court to obey. They face
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THE UNIFORM CHILD CUSTODY JURISDICTION ACT

To combat the forum shopping problem described above, and to
create a consistent approach to child custody decisions, thirty-nine states
have adopted the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiciton Act. 19 The major provisions of the U.C.C.J.A. are its limitation on jurisdictional
choices in custody disputes and its elimination of the mere physical presence of the child within a state as determinative in custody decisions.
The U.C.C.J.A. removes the incentive for a parent to take a child from
one state to another to obtain a favorable modification of the custody

decree.
The U.C.C.J.A. establishes a procedural scheme to determine
whether a court may assume jurisdiction to either issue a custody decision or to modify a custody judgment of another state's court. The basic
premise of the U.C.C.J.A. is that only one court should assume responsibility for a custody judgment. 20 Under the U.C.C.J.A. State A must
contempt and possible criminal charges for child stealing in one state while complying with
the court decree in another. Furthermore, a custody decree made in one state is often overruled in another jurisdiction the next year and the child is handed over to a new parent or
guardian. See In re Guardianship of Rogers, 100 Ariz. 269, 413 P.2d 744 (Sup. Ct. 1966);
Berlin v. Berlin, 239 Md. 52, 210 A.2d 380 (Sup. Ct. 1956); Berlin v. Berlin, 21 N.Y.2d 371,
355 N.E.2d 109 (Sup. Ct. 1967), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 840 (1968); Commonwealth ex re.
Thomas v. Gillard, 203 Pa. Super. 95, 198 A.2d 377 (1964).
19 THE UNIFORM CHILD CUSTODY JURISDICTION ACT §§ 1-28, 9 U.L.A. 116 (1968)
[hereinafter cited as U.C.C.J.A.]. Thejurisdiction section of the U.C.C.J.A. is the heart of the
Act. It provides:
(a) A court of this State which is competent to decide child custody matters has
jurisdiction to make a child custody determination by initial or modification decree if:
(1) this State (i) is the home state of commencement of the proceeding, or (ii) had
been the child's home state within 6 months before commencement of the proceeding
and the child is absent from this State because of his removal or retention by a person
claiming his custody or for other reasons, and a parent or person acting as parent continues to live in this State; or
(2) it is in the best interest of the child that a court of this State assume jurisdiction
because (i) the child and his parents, or the child and at least one contestant, have a
signiftantconnection with this State, and (ii) there is available in this State substantial evidence concerning the child's present or future care, protection, training, and personal
relationships; or
(3) the child is physically present in this State and (i) the child has been abandoned or (ii) it is necessary in an emergency to protect the child because he has been
subjected to or threatened with mistreatment or abuse or is otherwise neglected (or dependent); or
(4) (i) it appears that no other state would have jurisdiction under prerequisites
substantially in accordance with paragraphs (1), (2), or (3), or another state has declined
to exercise jurisdiction on the ground that this State is the more appropriate forum to
determine the custody of the child, and (ii) it is in the best interest of the child that this
court assume jurisdiction.
(b) Except under paragraphs (3) and (4) of subsection (a), physical presence in this
State of the child, or of the child and one of the contestants, is not alone sufficient to
confer jurisdiction on a court of this state to make a child custody determination.
(c) Physical presence of the child, while desirable, is not a prerequisite for jurisdiction to determine his custody.
20 Id. § 1.
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recognize and enforce the custody decree of State B if State B initially
rendered its decision based on proper jurisdiction. A court in State A
may not modify the decree unless it determines that State B no longer
has jurisdiction or has failed to assume jurisdiction under the
U.C.C.J.A.'s jurisdictional requirements. These jurisdictional provisions
require that a connection exist between the child and the state claiming
to have jurisdiction. This connection must arise from something more
than the physical presence of the child within the state.2 t For example,
the U.C.C.J.A. specifies that the child's "home state," 2 2 the state in
which he lived at least six months before the proceedings began and
from which the child is absent because of removal by the noncustodial
parent, has jurisdiction over the custody decree.23 Furthermore, the
U.C.C.J.A. grants jurisdiction to a state to which the child and at least
one parent have a "significant connection" if there is available in that
state substantial evidence concerning the child's present or future care,
24
protection, training, and personal relationship with the parent.
The U.C.C.J.A. limits the ability of custody claimants to sue in the
court of almost any state, no matter how tenuous the connection between the family, the child, and that state.2 5 Several impediments, however, lessen the U.C.C.J.A.'s intended impact on the problem of child
snatching. The U.C.C.J.A. is ineffective in the five states that have
failed to adopt it.26 The refusal of these states to adopt and implement
27
the U.C.C.J.A. has made them "haven states" for child snatchers.
These states, by continuing to allow modification of the child custody
decrees of sister states, preserve the incentive for noncustodial parents to
abduct their children.
21 Id. § 3(c).
22 "Home state" means the state in which the child immediately preceding the time involved lived with his parents, a parent or a person acting as parent, for at least 6 consecutive
months. . . ... Id. § 2.

23 Id. § 3(c).
24 By the phrases "significant connection" and "substantial evidence" the drafters intended to cover many fact situations too diverse to be stated specifically. Although it is clear
that short term presence in the state does not significantly connect one with that state, although he may intend to stay longer, the specific definitions of "significant connection" and
"substantial evidence" are left to the courts. Id. § 3 Commissioner's note.
Some courts find a "significant connection" to a state when the parent and child have
been domiciled in the state for a sufficient period of time and the state provides substantial
evidence concerning the welfare of the child. See Nelson v. District Court, 186 Colo. 381,385,
527 P.2d. 811, 813 (Sup. Ct. 1974); Etter v. Etter, 43 Md. App. 395, 399, 405 A.2d 760, 763
(1979); Green v. Green, 87 Mich. App. 706, 714, 276 N.W.2d 472, 475 (1978); Theresa H. v.
Pasquale G., 102 Misc. 2d 759, 763, 424 N.Y.S.2d 652, 654 (1980).
25 See R. LE-'LAR, AMERICAN CONFLICTS LAw (2d ed. 1968).

26 The five states which have not adopted the U.C.C.J.A. are Massachusetts, Mississippi,
New Mexico, Utah, and Texas.
27 126 CONG. REc. S 1,487 (daily ed. Aug. 25, 1980) (testimony of Senator Wallop).
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Another impediment to the effectiveness of the U.C.C.J.A. is the
Act's applicability to only those cases in which the snatching parent petitions a court for a modification of a custody decree. In approximately
seventy percent of child snatching cases the noncustodial parent and the
abducted child remain hidden from both the custodial parent and the
authorities and thereby avoid the U.C.C.J.A.'s provisions against child
snatching.2 8 Unfortunately, the U.C.C.J.A. may encourage child
snatchers to remain permanently concealed from authorities and thus
deprive the custodial parents of any information concerning their
snatched children.
Poor drafting further limits the effectiveness of the U.C.C.J.A. Several provisions of the U.C.C.J.A. contribute to a lack of uniformity in
judicial application of the Act. In section three of the Act, for example,
the drafters had the option of limiting judicial discretion by making the
"home state" the only criterion for determining whether a court had
jurisdiction. 29 Instead, section 3(a)(2) provides that a court of another
state may also assume jurisdiction to award custody or to modify a decree if it is in "the best interests of the child" and if a "significant connection" exists between the child and that state. 30 Judicial discretion
thus becomes a factor in custody decisions and increases the opportunity
for inconsistency. Since the state court can still determine what the
child's best interests are and whether there is a significant connection
between the child and state, and then can decide whether these factors
are substantial enough to justify a modification of the custody decree,
section 3(a)(2) creates problems similar to those that existed before the
enactment of the U.C.C.J.A. The provision encourages noncustodial
parents to snatch their children and seek a modification of a custody
decree in the hope that they can convince a new court that the abduction was in the child's best interests.
Finally, the reluctance of state agencies to enforce child snatching
laws and custody decrees compounds the ineffectiveness of the
U.C.C.J.A. Despite a state's adoption of the U.C.C.J.A., state and local
agencies have been reluctant to become involved in child snatching matters because the agencies view the disputes as domestic arguments which
31
do not merit agency time and resources.
28 Hearingon H.R. 1290, supra note 3, at 17 (statement of Arnold Miller, President of Children's Rights, Inc.).
29 See supra note 22.
30 U.C.C.J.A., supra note 19, § 3(a)(2).
31 Lawrence Kurlander, the District Attorney in Rochester, New York, and a member of
a special prosecutor unit specifically designed to pursue child snatchers, stated that "[m]ost
agencies just don't consider child snatching to be criminal conduct. They feel it's a domestic
dispute, and they'd rather stay out of it." Pick, supra note 2, at 30.
A parent who had a child snatched commented on the local enforcement agencies' lack

1982]

PARENTAL KIDNAPPINGPREVENTION ACT

1183

The above mentioned inadequacies of the U.C.C.J.A. have allowed
child snatching to remain a problem even in states that have adopted
the Act. The failure of the U.C.C.J.A. to solve the problem has caused
the supporters of child snatching regulation to turn to the federal government for help.32 In response, Congress has declared:

While legal issues relating to divorce and child custody matters have traditionally been within the domain of the States, and not the Federal Government, it is within the province of the Federal Government to resolve
and which the States, acting indeproblems which are interstate in origin
33
pendently, seem unable to resolve.
III.

THE PARENTAL KIDNAPPING PREVENTION ACT

The Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act was introduced in the
United States Senate in 1979 and signed into law in 1980. 34 The Act
of interest in the case: "After your first round down at the local police station, you find out
real fast that no one's going to do anything; and you don't bother going back there, because, I
mean, you just know that isn't going to do it." Child SnatchingHearings, supra note 3, at 46.
32 For a list of the organizations supporting a federal child snatching law, see Kidnapping
Hearings, supra note 1, at 9.
33 Child Snatching Hearings, supra note 3, at 2. President Reagan and Congress recently
expressed their concern over the plight of missing children and their desire to involve the
resources of the federal government to locate the kidnapped children by passing and signing
into law the Missing Children Act. The Act creates a national clearinghouse of computerized
information to help parents locate their missing children. See N.Y. Times, Oct. 13, 1982, § 1,
at 15, col. 1.
34 Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-611, 94 Stat. 3566 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C., 28 U.S.C. & 42 U.S.C.), states in pertinent
part:
Sec.7 (c). The general purpose of sections 6 to 10 of this Act are to(1) promote cooperation between State courts to the end that a determination of
custody and visitation is rendered in the State which can best decide the case in the
interest of the child;
(2) promote and expand the exchange of information and other forms of mutual
assistance betwen States which are concerned with the same child;
(3) facilitate the enforcement of custody and visitation decrees of sister States;
(4) discourage continuing interstate controversies over child custody in the interest
of greater stability of home environment and of secure family relationships for the
child;
(5) avoid jurisdictional competition and conflict between State courts in matters of
child custody and visitation which have in the past resulted in the shifting of children from State to State with harmful effects on their well-being and;
(6) deter interstate abductions and other unilateral removals of children undertaken to obtain custody and visitations awards.
Sec. 8(a). The appropriate authorities of every State shall enforce according to its terms,
and shall not modify except as provided in subsection (f) of this section, any child custody determination made consistently with the provisions of this section by a court of
another State . . ..
Sec. 9(a). The Secretary shall enter into an agreement with any State which is able and
willing to do so, under which the services of the Parent Locator Service established under
section 453 shall be made available to such State for the purpose of determining the
whereabouts of any absent parent or child. . ..
Sec.10(a). In view of the findings of the Congress and the purposes of sections 6 to 10 of
this Act set forth in section 302, the Congress hereby expressly declares its intent that
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establishes a national policy against child snatching and a uniform approach to the various states' treatment of child custody decrees. 35 To
accomplish these goals, the drafters of the Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act created three interrelated sections. The first section requires
that state courts extend full faith and credit to child custody decrees
entered in other states. 36 As a result, except in specified circumstances,
state courts must enforce the custody decrees of sister states without
37
modification.
Although the first section eliminates the incentive for a noncustodial parent to take a child to a more favorable forum, it also encourages an abducting parent to remain permanently hidden from
authorities. 38 The drafters of the Act sought to avoid this dilemma in
the second section, which allows the use of the state and federal Parent
Locator Services to find a missing child. 39 Under regulations the Department of Health and Human Services promulgated, 40 if a state has
entered into an agreement with the Department to use the Federal Locator Services and the state agrees to pay the fees for processing requested information, residents of that state may obtain any information
that the Locator Services have concerning the most recent home address
and place of employment of an absent parent or missing child. 4 1 The
section 1073 of title 18, United States Code, apply to cases involving parental kidnapping and interstate or international flight to avoid prosecution under applicable State
felony statutes.
35 Id. § 7(c), 94 Stat. 3568. Senator Wallop, who introduced the Act, stated, "[i]f we in
Congress can establish a strong national policy against child-snatching and for a fair adjudication of custody and visitation rights where both fathers and mothers are treated equally, we
will have performed an important leadership role." Kidnapping Hearings, supra note 1, at 8.
36 Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-611, § 8(a), 94 Stat. 3566,
3569 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C., 28 U.S.C. & 42 U.S.C.).
37 A state court may modify the child custody determination of another state court when
"(1) it has jurisdiction to make such a child custody determination; and (2) the court of the
other State no longer has jurisdiction, or it has declined to exercise such jurisdiction to modify
such determination." Id. § 8(0, 94 Stat. 3571.
38 The full faith and credit doctrine applies when a noncustodial parent steals the child
and attempts to relitigate the custody decree. Under the doctrine such a decree modification
is not allowed and the child is returned to the custodial parent. A snatching parent will
therefore refrain from relitigating the issue and will attempt to keep the child hidden from
authorities so as to reduce the custodial parent's chances of locating his child.
39 Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-611, § 9(a), 94 stat. 3566,
3571 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C., 28 U.S.C. & 42 U.S.C.).
40 461 Fed. Reg. 212 (1981).
41 The Department of Health and Human Services (H.H.S.) and the Office of Child Support Enforcement (O.C.S.E.), an agency within H.H.S., are in charge of the Federal Parent
Locator Services (F.P.L.S.). Under the Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act states may enter
into an agreement with the O.C.S.E. to obtain F.P.L.S. information on the location of a
parent or child. This information can be used in parental kidnapping cases, or to aid in the
making or enforcing of a child custody determination. The Act precludes payment of any
federal matching funds for the cost of these agreements and the regulations accordingly provide that the state must collect or pay the processing fees to the F.P.L.S. As a part of the

1982]

PARENTAL KIDNAPPING PREVENTION ACT

1185

availability of this service increases the chances of finding a hidden child
and thus may deter child snatching to some extent.

42
The third section of the Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act
states that the Fugitive Felon Act 43 shall apply in cases of parental kid-

napping when a noncustodial parent takes a child across state lines to
avoid prosecution under a state felony statute. As a result, authorities in
states where child snatching is a felony 44 can issue a Federal Unlawful
Flight to Avoid Prosecution Warrant for the arrest of a noncustodial
parent who abducts a child and crosses state lines. The Department of
Justice, therefore, becomes involved in child snatching cases. Furthermore, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) 45 is to provide assist-

ance to state law enforcement authorities in their efforts to apprehend
the noncustodial parent and return the abducted child to the custodial
parent.
Because the first two sections of the Parental Kidnapping Preven46
tion Act alone are of limited effectiveness in locating missing children,
the success of the Act largely depends upon the implementation of the
third section. The FBI, as the investigative unit of the Department of
Justice, is the enforcement mechanism of the Act. The FBI's participation would grant parents searching for their children access to previously unavailable federal resources, and would result in a coordinated,
comprehensive national search for the missing children.4 7 As a result,
agreement, states also distinguish parental kidnapping and child custody requests from child
support enforcement requests so that the O.C.S.E. can make proper billings for the costs. The
state must agree to restrict access to the data, to store it securely, and otherwise ensure its
confidentiality. In return, O.C.S.E. agrees to provide the most recent home address and
place of employment of any absent parent or child. Id.
42 Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-611, § 10(a), 94 Stat.
3566, 3573, (codified as amended in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C., 28 U.S.C. & 42 U.S.C.).
43 The Fugitive Felon Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1073 (1976), provides that the government will
issue a Federal Unlawful Flight to Avoid Prosecution warrant and will provide FBI assistance
when fugitives flee state justice. To obtain a federal warrant under the Fugitive Felon Act,
there must be probable cause to believe that a fugitive charged with a state felony has fled
that state and that his flight was for the purpose of avoiding prosecution.
44 A survey conducted by the American Bar Association in 1981 found that of the 53
jurisdictions surveyed, 39 states have felony child abduction and restraint statutes. Freed &
Hoff, Imblementation of the ParentalKidnappingPrevention Act of 1980, 1981 A.B.A. SEc. FAM. L.
III (1981).
45 The FBI is the investigative unit of the United States Department of Justice. OFf-IcE
OF THE FEDERAL REGISTER, THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT MANUAL 344 (1981-82)

[hereinafter cited as UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT MANUAL].
46 The full faith and credit section does not help locate abducted children. It states only
that custody decrees will not be modified. The Federal Parent Locator Services' information
is derived from social security records and, at most, consists of the home and employment
address of the parent or child. Neither the full faith and credit section nor the Parent Locator
Services section actively assists those attempting to locate an abducted child.
47 The FBI has 60 field offices strategically located in the major cities of the United States.
These field office facilitate a coordinated national search. Without them, parents searching
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the FBI's refusal to enforce state felony child snatching statutes would
significantly limit the effectiveness of the Act in preventing parental
kidnappings.
The unconditional language and the legislative history of the third
section of the Act reflect the drafters' intent to give interstate child
snatching the same treatment as other state felonies under the Fugitive
Felon Act. The conference report on the Act states: "It is the Conferees'
view that section 1073 [the Fugitive Felon Act] should be applied to
state felony parental kidnapping cases in the same manner as to any
other state felon case .... *"48 Consequently, the same federal procedures generally followed in other state felony cases under the Fugitive
Felon Act should also apply in state felony child snatching cases. The
Justice Department, however, has not complied with the congressional
directive. The Department currently follows different procedures in
child snatching cases than those it follows in other state felony cases.
IV.

THE JUSTICE DEPARTMENT'S REACTION TO THE PARENTAL
KIDNAPPING PREVENTION ACT

Justice Department procedures consistently followed in all state felony cases include the unconditional issuance of a federal warrant and
the automatic involvement of the FBI in the investigation once a fugitive has crossed state lines. 49 Contrary to the intent of Congress that
federal authorities treat child snatching the same as all other state felonies, the Justice Department has issued regulations which create differ50
ent warrant and investigation procedures for child snatching cases.
for their children would have to continually educate state officials regarding their cases and

personally coordinate the individual state efforts. The FBI also has access to federal resources
previously unavailable to parents searching for their children. These resources include a personnel staff exceeding 15,000, laboratory services, training facilities, fingerprint identification
and the National Crime Information Center. See UNITED STATE GOVERNMENT MANUAL,
supra note 45, at 344; L. HUSTON, THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE 216 (1967).
48 Domestic Violence Prevention and Services Act: Conference Report Before the House Judicia,7

Comm., H.R. REP. No. 96-1401, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 42 (1980).
49 Paul R. Michel, Acting Deputy Attorney General of the Department of Justice, testified before the Subcommittee on Criminal Justice that the Justice Department does not apply
the child abducting danger standard to any other state felony as a prerequisite for issuing a
warrant and granting FBI assistance under the Fugitive Felon Act. KidnappingHearings,supra
note 1, at 44.

50 The Department of Justice regulations state in pertinent part:
Congress now has expressly stated that 18 U.S.C. § 1073 be applied in parental abduction situations. In our view, the expression of Congressional intent does not require rou-

tine Federal involvement in parental abduction situations and is consistent with the
Department's general policy militating against Federal involvement in domestic matters,

including abduction situations. Furthermore, the sound exercise of prosecutorial discretion and the need for careful utilization of Department manpower and resources will

require selectivity in seeking Federal warrants in these situations.
In an effort to fulfill Congressional intent consistent with its other responsibilities,
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The regulations state that no federal warrant will be issued under the
Fugitive Felon Act unless there is "independent credible information
that the child is in physical danger or is then in a condition of abuse or
neglect." 5 1
The Department's regulations create what one observer calls a
"Catch-22. ' '52 The Justice Department will not act unless the parent
supplies "independent credible information" that a child has suffered
abuse or is in serious danger. Yet, to ascertain the child's physical condition, the parent needs to know the child's whereabouts; if the parent
knows the whereabouts of the child, the parent has little reason to ask
the Justice Department for assistance in locating that child. It is precisely because state authorities do not know the whereabouts or condition of abducted children that they require federal help. Conditioning
federal involvement upon evidence that the noncustodial parent is
neglecting or endangering an abducted child renders the third section of
the Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act useless. Because the custodial
parent usually does not know the whereabouts of his or her child 53 and,
therefore, cannot produce the evidence required to qualify for FBI
assistance, only a small number of child snatching cases qualify for federal assistance under these regulations. 54 The Justice Department has
ignored the clear mandate of Congress to treat child snatching as it does
other state felonies and has limited the effectiveness of the crucial third
provision of the Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act by restricting the
involvement of the FBI in child snatching cases. In the words of Representative William Hughes, Chairman of the House Judiciary Subcommittee on Crime, the Justice Department has "created a different crime
'55
altogether - one of child abuse or child neglect."
The Justice Department is cognizant of the congressional intent behind the Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act and its drafters' displeasure with its regulations. 5 6 The Department, however, continues to
the Department will authorize FBI involvement under 18 U.S.C. § 1073 in parental kidnapping cases where there is independent credible information establishing that the
child is in physical danger or is being seriously neglected or seriously abused.
U.S. JUST. DEP'T, supra note 10, at 9-69.421.
51 Id.
52 See Freed & Hoff, supra note 44, at 6.
53 See Hearingon H.R. 1290, supra note 3.
54 Justice Department statistics on child snatching cases reveal the limited effect of the
regulations on the number of cases that the Department will investigate. Of 472 cases
brought to the attention of FBI field offices, 76 involved the crossing of state lines and thus fell
under the Fugitive Felon Act. Because of the failure to satisfy the regulations' requirements
on the standard of proof, involvement was declined in 43 of 76 cases. 7 FAM. L. REP. (BNA)
2739 (Oct. 6, 1981).
55 Id.
56 In an oversight congressional hearing, Chairman William Hughes informed Larry
Lippe of the Criminal Division of the Justice Department that the Department has ignored
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enforce the regulations because, as a Department official stated, "we believe we cannot routinely involve the FBI in child snatching situations
based on the same criteria that would be applied to other state felonies
such as murder or armed robbery. 5 7T The official claimed that the Department's authority to ignore congressional intent and to promulgate
contrary regulations is inherent in its prosecutorial discretion. 58
The Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act has thus inspired a clash
of interests between an executive agency and Congress. At issue is which
branch of government will establish the federal policy on child snatching: Congress with its legislative power or the Justice Department with
its rulemaking power. The resolution of this struggle is crucial for two
reasons. First, there is an urgent need to clarify the federal position on
child snatching. Inconsistent federal policies have contributed to the
confusion and frustration suffered by parents searching for their missing
children. 59 Furthermore, due to the regulations that restrict the impact
of the Act, the Justice Department has denied federal assistance in many
the clear intent of Congress by imposing a harm requirement for the issuance of warrants in
parental kidnapping cases. Id. at 2742.
The Justice Department has responded to the criticism by redrafting the regulations to
more closely mirror the intent of Congress. The slight changes made in the text, however, are
not sufficient to alter the limiting impact of the regulations on child snatching cases. According to Patricia Hoff of the American Bar Association's Child Custody Project, the revised
guidelines amount to "little more than a reformulation of the pre-Act policy disapproved by
Congress." Id. at 2739.
The three redrafted forms of the regulations state that a federal warrant will not be
issued without (a) "convincing evidence that the child was in danger of serious bodily harm as
a result of the mental condition or past behavior patterns of the abducting parent." U.S.
JUST. DEP'T, supra note 10, at 9-69.42 1; (b) "independent credible information establishing
that the child is in physical danger or is being seriously abused or seriously neglected." Id.; or
(c) "independent credible information that the child is in physical danger or is then in a
condition of abuse or neglect." Id.
57 7 FAM. L. REP. (BNA) 2741 (Oct. 6, 1981).
58 Id. See supra note 50.
59 The Justice Department's policy on child snatching cases dictates the extent of federal
involvement in these cases. This policy is relatively unknown to the public, however, and is
inconsistently applied, two factors which create even greater confusion.
Two child snatching cases reflect the Justice Department's inconsistent application of the
regulation. In the first case, all of the jurisdictional requirements under the Fugitive Felon
Act were satisfied. Following the interstate flight of the abducting parent, the cutodial parent
was able to prove that her abducted children were in danger because of her ex-husband's past
history of alcoholism, drug abuse, and psychiatric problems. Although this case met all of the
requirements set out by the Justice Department itself, the Department refused to become
involved. Only after the parent personally traveled to Washington to meet with representatives of the Justice Department was she able to convince the officials that she satisfied their
guidelines and deserved help. In the second case, the Justice Department told a mother of an
abducted child that the Department would render assistance if her child was in need of medical care for a life threatening condition. Although the mother accordingly proved that her
child did suffer from a severe allergy which could become life endangering if not treated with
medication, the Department rejected this proof as satisfying the requirements and refused to
offer any assistance. Hearing on HR. 1290, supra note 3, at 20-21.
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child snatching cases that would otherwise qualify for federal aid under
the expressed congressional child snatching policy. 60
From a broader perspective, moreover, the resolution of the power
struggle in favor of the congressional intention to provide substantial
federal assistance in child snatching cases is important to preserve the
separation of powers doctrine. 6' This doctrine does not permit executive
agencies to have such broad rulemaking power that they can contradict
legislative intent and, in essence, enforce their own legislation. If the
Justice Department can promulgate and enforce regulations which explicitly contradict the express intent of Congress, the powers of the Executive and Legislative branches would no longer be distinct. The
remainder of this Comment will analyze the possible grounds of authority for the Justice Department to issue a policy statement on child
snatching which conflicts with congressional design and will suggest
some measures needed to create a consistent, effective federal policy on
child snatching.

V.

THE JUSTICE DEPARTMENT'S "LEGISLATIVE POWER"

For the last fifty years, the executive agencys' informal promulgation of regulations has been an important part of the operations of the
federal government. 62 Courts have long recognized the power of an executive agency such as the Justice Department to, issue regulations to
implement federal statutes. 63 Also recognized, however, is that a limitation exists upon an agency's power to promulgate regulations. 64 Although courts give deference to an agency's interpretation of a statute,65
they will also interpret these statutes independently.6 6 Congressional in60 See supra note 54.
61 Seegenerally

G.

GUNTHER, CASES AND-MATERIALS ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 400 (9th

ed. 1975).
62 See Delong, Informal Rulemaking and the ntergration of Law and Po/iq,, 65 VA. L. REv. 257
n.1 (1979).
63 According to Professor Kenneth C. Davis, Congress first legislatively created federal
agencies in 1789. Academics regard the organization of the Interstate Commerce Commission in 1887 as" 'the seminal event in the history of administrative law,' the beginning of the
age of regulation." Id.
64 See, e.g., Industrial Union Department, AFL-CIO v. American Petroleum Institute, 448
U.S. 607 (1980); Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, 426 U.S. 88 (1976); Greene v. McElroy, 360
U.S. 474 (1959); Kent v. Dolles, 357 U.S. 116 (1958); Oklahoma Press Publishing Co. v.
Walling, 327 U.S. 186, 216 (1946). See generaly 2 AM. JUR. 2d Administrative Law 188 (1962).
65 If an agency's interpretation of a congressional statute has a "reasonable basis in law"
courts will ordinarily not challenge the agency's interpretation and application of the statute.
E.g., Federal Maritime Commission v. Seatrain Lines, Inc., 411 U.S. 726, 745-46 (1973). See
also infra note 66.
66 For example, in Espinoza v. Farah Manufacturing Co., 414 U.S. 86 (1973), the United
States Supreme Court found a regulation issued by the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission to be inconsistent with the congressional intent behind Title VI. The Court
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tent circumscribes agency rulemaking powers and an agency acts
outside of the scope of its delegated powers by promulgating regulations
which contradict congressional intent. As a result, the Supreme Court
has invalidated regulations found to be contrary to congressional
intent.

67

The Justice Department's regulations on child snatching exceed its
rulemaking authority. They are contrary to the directive of Congress
that the FBI actively enforce state felony child snatching laws by issuing
warrants regardless of whether a parent can demonstrate that the noncustodial parent is endangering or abusing the kidnapped child.
In support of its regulations, the Department relies primarily on
previous expressions of Congress against federal involvement in domes68
tic relations. For example, in enacting the Federal Kidnapping Act the only federal law related to child abduction prior to the passage of
the Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act - Congress specifically excluded parental kidnapping from its purview. The Federal Kidnapping
Act, Justice Department officials claim, reflects congressional intent condecided that a court should give deference to an agency's interpretation, "but that deference
must have limits where, as here, application of the guideline would be inconsistent with an
obvious Congressional intent." Id. at 94. See also Federal Maritime Commission v. Seatrain
Lines, Inc., 411 U.S. at 745; Crowell v. Benson; 285 U.S. 22 (1932).
67 See cases cited supra note 64. In Manhattan General Equipment Co. v. Commissioner
of Internal Revenue, 297 U.S. 129 (1936), the Supreme Court overturned a Treasury Department regulation because it was inconsistent with the congressional intent behind the Revenue
Act of 1926. The Court stated:
The power of an administrative officer of board to administer a federal statute and to
prescribe rules and regulations to that end is not the power to make law - for no such
power can be delegated by Congress - but the power to adopt regulations to carry into
effect the will of Congress as expressed by the statute. A regulation which does not do
this, but operates to create a rule out of harmony with the statute, is a mere nullity.
Id. at 134. The Court also recognized limits to an agency's rulemaking power in Espinoza v.
Farah Manufacturing Co., 414 U.S. 86 (1976), when it held that the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission exceeded its authority by promulgating a regulation which was
inconsistent with the intent of Congress. As in Manhattan General Equibment, the Court examined the effect of the regulation and the agency's rationale for the rule to determine if the
regulation was invalid because it contradicted the intent of a congressional statute. See also
United States v. Larinoff, 431 U.S. 864, 873 (1977) ("regulations, in order to be valid must be
consistent with the statute under which they are promulgated."); Morton v. Ruiz, 415 U.S.
199, 232 (1974) ("This agency power to make rules that affect substantial individual rights
and obligations carries with it the responsibility not only to remain consistent with the governing legislation, but also to employ procedures that conform to the law." (citations omitted)); Colgate-Palmolive-Peet Co. v. National Labor Relations Board, 338 U.S. 355, 363-64
(1949) ("To sustain the Board's contention would be to permit the Board under the guise of
administration to put limitations in the statute not placed there by Congress . . . . The
emasculation of the contract pressed for by the Board in order to achieve that which Congress
refused to enact into law cannot be sustained.").
68 The Federal Kidnapping Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1201(a) (1976) states in pertinent part:
"Whoever knowingly transports in interstate or foreign commerce, any person who has been
unlawfully seized. . . except, in the case of a minor, by a parent thereof, shall be punished."
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sistent with its current regulations which limit federal involvement in
69
domestic matters such as parental kidnapping.
Department officials have also stressed that the domestic nature of
child snatching creates difficulties with the enforcement of the Parental
Kidnapping Prevention Act and with the prosecution of offenders. 70 A
Justice Department report on the implementation of the Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act stated that the enforcement of child snatching
laws would not serve "a genuine criminal law enforcement purpose" especially because a significant number of states have not made the offense a felony. 7 1 The report also stated that a parent who snatches a
child is unlike an "ordinary felon" who presents a continuing threat of
violence to society. 72 In the Department's view, the "quasi-civil" 73 or
non-threatening nature of child snatching relegates the offense to a position of low priority and justifies the Department's restrictive enforcement of the Fugitive Felon Act. 74 The Department officials admit that
69 Testifying before the Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Lee Colwell, Executive Assistant Director of the FBI, stated, "We are governed by a Department of Justice policy which I
believe reflects the intent of the kidnapping law which specifically excluded the family relationship." Kidnapping Hearings, supra note 1, at 43. The Justice Department regulations
provide:
It has long been Department policy to avoid involvement in situations which are essentially domestic relations controversies. This policy has been based, in part, on the parental abduction exception in the Federal Kidnapping statute from which we inferred a
Congressional intent that Federal law enforcement authorities stay out of such
controversies.
U.S. JUST. DEP'T, supra note 10, at 9-69.421.
70 7 FAM. L. REP. (BNA) 2739, 2741 (Oct. 6, 1981).
71 U.S. JusT. DEP'T, REPORT ON THE IMPLEMENTATION OF PARENTAL KIDNAPPING

1980 5 (1981).
The Justice Department does not define a "genuine criminal law enforcement purpose."
The Department has, however, declared its intention to focus its resources on strong cases,
including those involving sophisticated investigative techniques and those which have a community-wide impact. See in/ia note 74. Cases with these characteristics may satisfy the Department's stated law enforcement purpose.
72 Rather than labeling the child snatcher as an "ordinary felon," the Department depicts
the offender as a concerned parent. Id.
73 Id.
74 Lee Colwell, Executive Assistant Director of the FBI, testified as to the low level of
priority the FBI gives to child snatching cases:
In discussing the issue of FBI resources, perhaps it would be helpful to explain
briefly the FBI's quality case concept. Factors, including the increasing capabilities of
local and State law enforcement have led to a withdrawal of FBI investigative activity in
traditional areas such as bank robberies, property crimes and fugitive investigations. FBI
efforts have been focused on cases with high prosecutive potential, cases requiring greater
investigative sophistication and cases having a greater impact on the community at large
such as foreign counter-intelligence, organized crime and financial crime. This policy
has been encouraged by both Congress and the Department of Justice. We question
whether it is perhaps anomalous for the FBI to withdraw from investigations of bank
robberies and escaped Federal prisoners and at the same time assume responsibility for a
misdemeanor involving essentially a family relations problem.
Kidnapping Hearings,supra note 1, at 27.
PREVENTION ACT OF
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their agents' limited training in psychology, sociology, domestic relation
disputes, and family law also contributes to departmental reluctance to
enforce the federal Act. The Department fears that its untrained agents
may inflict additional emotional or psychological trauma on a child
during its search and return of the child to the custodial parent. 75 A
Justice Department representative further explained that the nature of
child snatching makes prosecution difficult due to the existence of conflicting custody decrees and the "repeated instances" of custodial parents dropping the state felony charges against the abducting parent once
they regain custody of their child. 76 The Department contends that if
parents can thus impair the ability to prosecute, the Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act is ineffective and full enforcement is a waste of resources and an abuse of the legal process. 77 In sum, the Justice
Department's position is that the difficulties of enforcement outweigh
the benefits of the Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act, and thus justify
78
departmental restriction of its application.
Contrary to the importance Congress has placed on federal involvement in child snatching cases, the Justice Department ignores its legislative mandate, de-emphasizes the seriousness of the offense, and expresses
its reluctance to expend resources on a domestic matter. The inconsistency between the Department's regulations and congressional intent indicates that the Justice Department has exceeded its rulemaking
authority. The authority to create policy primarily rests with Congress. 7 9 The function of executive agencies is to implement federal law.
When an agency's action is contrary to the intent of Congress, the
agency has exceeded its delegated authority by assuming a legislative
function and its action is, therefore, invalid.80 The Department of Justice assumed this unauthorized legislative posture when it issued regulations inconsistent with the express intent of Congress. Based upon the
Justice Department's lack of authority, new Department regulations
should be promulgated which are consistent with congressional intent.
All indications suggest, however, that the Justice Department will not
75 Id. at 22 (statement of Paul Michel).
76 U.S. JusT. DEP'T, supra note 71, at 5.
77 Lawrence Lippe of the Department of Justice commented to the effect that:
Repeatedly, after FBI involvement has been authorized, the department has seen state
felony charges dropped shortly after the complaining parent regained custody of the
child. We suggest that the use of the Fugitive Felon Act in situations where state authorities have no actual intention of prosecuting the underlying felony charge, would amount
to an abuse of legal process.
7 FAM. L. RaP. (BNA) 2739, 2741 (Oct. 6, 1981).
78 Id.
79 U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 1 grants Congress legislative powers. The President, however,
does have the power to veto Congressional action. Id. § 7, cl. 2.
80 See supra notes 66-67 and accompanying text.
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voluntarily revoke its regulations."' Apparently, only affirmative action
against the Department will cause the invalidation of the regulations.
Either Congress should specifically nullify the Justice Department's regulations through legislation, or a private party should bring suit against
the Department so that a court may invalidate the regulations and compel agency action.
VI.
A.

TOWARD AN EFFECTIVE CHILD SNATCHING LAW

CONGRESSIONAL ACTION

Congress may express its disapproval of the Justice Department's
regulations through several means. 8 2 Several Congressmen are presently
pursuing the most direct method of reversing an agency regulation: a
statutory rejection of the offending regulation. On October 21, 1981,
Senators Malcolm Wallop of Wyoming and Alan Cranston of California
introduced Senate Bill 175983 to clarify congressional intent regarding
the proper application of the Fugitive Felon Act to state felony parental
kidnapping cases.8 4 Senate Bill 1759 provides that the Fugitive Felon
81 One indication of the Justice Department's reluctance to revoke its regulations is its
refusal in three successive instances to significantly revise their contents despite clear instructions from Congress. See supra note 56.
82 Congress has several statutory and nonstatutory mechanisms at its disposal with which
to express its disapproval of agency regulations. Their use may prompt agencies to reverse or
modify the offensive regulations. These mechanisms include:
(1) legislative oversight, investigative, and confirmation hearings;
(2) establishment of select committees and specialized subcommittees to oversee agency
rulemaking and enforcement;
(3) directives in committee reports regarding rules or their implementation;
(4) House and Senate floor statements critical of proposed, projected, or ongoing administrative action;
(5) direct contact between a congressional office and the agency or office in question;
(6) passage of a statute specifically overturning or preempting an agency rule; and,
(7) alterations in agency jurisdiction, authorization, or appropriations. Kaiser, CongressionalAction to Overturn Agenc Rules.- Alternatives to the "Legislative Veto," 32 AD. L. REV. 667,
668-69 (1980).
83 S. 1759, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. In pertinent part, Senate bill 1759 provides:
Congress further declares, notwithstanding any other provision of law, that such section
1073 apply to State felony parental kidnapping cases without restriction and in the same
manner as to all other State felony cases; and. . . not later than 30 days after the date of
enactment of this section, the Attorney General of the United States shall eliminate all
guidelines that require information that the child is in physical danger or is being abused
or neglected, corroboration, prior approval, or otherwise limit the application of such
section 1073 in State felony parental kidnapping cases in a manner which frustrates the
intent of Congress that such cases be subject to only the requirements applicable in the
case of all State felonies under such section.
84 Senator Malcolm Wallop, testified before a House Judiciary Subcommittee that:
After carefully monitoring the Justice Department's procedures to carry out their responsibilities under the act, I have concluded that the department is not properly implementing the program. The bill I am introducing today would clarify congressional intent
regarding FBI assistance to state and local authorities . . . . The Justice Department
has treated felony kidnapping cases as domestic, rather than criminal matters - a prac-
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Act applies unconditionally to child snatching cases. If passed, this bill
would eliminate any doubt as to what Congress intended in child
snatching cases. A provision of the bill requires the Attorney General to
eliminate all regulations which either require information that the noncustodial parent has endangered or abused the child or which otherwise
restrict the application of the Fugitive Felon Act in a manner dissimilar
to the treatment of all other state felonies under the Act. If passed, this
bill may restore the Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act to the level of
effectiveness that Congress originally intended.
Representatives William Hughes of New Jersey and Marvin Edwards of Oklahoma are also attempting to negate the Justice Department's regulations. On November 18, 1981, they introduced two related
bills on child snatching8 5 with the following statement: "Congress is not
about to stand idly by while the Justice Department ignores the law and
disregards the welfare of thousands of children and their distraught
mothers or fathers."'86 Hughes' bill, H.R. 5019, mirrors the Senate bill
discussed above and would require that the Justice Department rescind
its restrictive guidelines.8 7 Edwards' bill, H.R. 5018, takes a different
approach to the child snatching problem than that proposed by Representative Hughes, Senators Wallop and Cranston, or even the approach
embodied in the Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act. Unlike the Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act, H.R. 5018 would make child snatching a federal offense, impose penalties for violators, 88 and give the
federal government complete responsibility for its enforcement throughout the country. Under the Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act, the
FBI cannot take action in a state child snatching case unless that state
has classified child stealing as a felony, something not all states have
done. A law which makes parental kidnapping a federal offense would
most effectively deter child snatching. The enforcement of child snatching laws would no longer depend on how a state classifies child snatchtice which has continued unabated despite the clear expression on the part of Congress to
the contrary.
8 FAM. L. REP. (BNA) 2010, 2011 (Nov. 3, 1981).
85 Id. at 2068 (Dec. 1, 1981).
86 127 CONG.REc. H8547 (daily ed. Nov. 18, 1981).
87 Representative Hughes stated that the purpose of his bill was to restore the effectiveness
of federal child snatching legislation which had been "frustrated by unrealistic regulations
and red tape developed by the Justice Department." 8 FAM. L. REP. (BNA) 2068 (Dec. I,
1981).
88 H.R. 5018 would permit federal prosecution for interstate child snatching. "The bill
would provide for a one-to-five year prison sentence for any parent or accomplice convicted of
taking a child across a state line with the intent of violating an existing child custody decree."
Id. at 2069. In addition, any child custody decree awarded to the person who has stolen the
child would be voided. Id.
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ing. Thus, those states which have not made child snatching a felony 89
would no longer be havens for child abductors. Second, making child
snatching a federal offense would remove the Justice Department's discretion as to whether it will become involved in child snatching cases.
Instead, Justice Department involvement would be mandatory. 90 The
passage and the enforcement of any of the proposed laws should result
in a more effective child snatching law than the Parental Kidnapping
Prevention Act.
Passage of any of these bills, however, is not at all certain. In addition to the inherent obstacles that all congressional bills encounter in the
legislative process, 91 the Justice Department will strongly lobby against
the bills' enactment. 92 Moreover, as the Department's failure to enforce
the provisions of the Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act illustrates,
passage of a bill does not assure that the Justice Department will enforce
the provision. Because of these obstacles to a new child snatching bill,
there is no assurance that such a law will succeed in improving the child
snatching problem.
B.

PRIVATE ACTION

To invalidate the Justice Department regulations, custodial parents
who do not receive FBI assistance because of the Justice Department
89 See supra note 44.
90 Representative Edwards contends that child snatching should be made a federal crime
so as to
leave no doubt that those who are thinking of breaking [the child snatching law] face
being caught and punished. By making child snatching a federal crime, and by providing stiff prison sentences, Congress would make it clear that the federal government
stands ready and willing to protect the rights of not just the parent who has legal custody
of the child, but the rights and welfare of the young victim as well.

Id.
91 Once a bill is introduced into Congress, it faces several obstacles before it becomes
effective. A bill may fail to be enacted because of any one of the following reasons:
(1) the bill's backers may decide not to invest the large amount of resources it takes to
pass a bill;
(2) the bill may fail to get the requisite two-thirds vote of Congress;
(3) the president may decide to veto the bill. Kaiser, supra note 82, at 669.
92 It is most probable that the Justice Department will mount an intensive lobbying campaign against the new child snatching bills. The Department lobbied very strongly against
the passage of the Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act. Its opposition will be even stronger
against the new bills because they not only assure the FBI's participation in child snatching
cases, but they also greatly increase the level of the FBI's involvement.
The Justice Department's refusal to revoke or significantly revise its regulations, despite
direct suggestions and accusations from Members of Congress that the Department is frustrating the expressed intent of Congress, also suggests that it will be strongly opposed to new
federal child snatching bills. The Department's refusal to heed to the will of Congress must
reflect extreme tenacity on its part, for a Senate study on federal regulation determined that
"[i]t is a rare and short-tenured administrator who will defy a clear congressional directive
contained in a public law." Id. at 670.
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regulations 93 should institute a lawsuit against the federal government
under the Administrative Procedure Act. 94 The Administrative Procedure Act declares that a reviewing court shall compel agency action and
find unlawful the agency's behavior if it is "arbitrary, capricious, an
abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with the law." 95 The
Supreme Court has interpreted this provision to mean that the agency
must articulate a "rational connection between the facts found and the
choice made."'96 If a court finds the Justice Department based its regulations upon arbitrary or irrational facts, it could set the regulations
aside and compel Justice Department involvement in child snatching
cases.
The Justice Department justifies its regulations by asserting that
they comport with legislative intent as expressed when Congress passed
the Federal Kidnapping Act, but excluded parental kidnapping from its
purview. 97 The weakness of this argument lies in its reliance on Congress' past policy of non-involvement. The recent congressional man93 An individual has legal standing under the Administrative Procedure Act to sue a federal agency if that person is "suffering legal wrong because of agency action, or adversely
affected or aggrieved by agency action within the meaning of a relevant statute." 5 U.S.C.
§ 702 (1976).
The Supreme Court decided that a person is "adversely affected or aggrieved. . . within
the meaning of a relevant statute," and hence has standing to sue, when the person alleges
(1) that he has or will sustain some actual or threatened injury in fact resulting from the
challenged agency action, and (2) that the alleged injury is to an interest "arguably within
the zone of interests to be protected or regulated by the statute or constitutional guarantee in
question." Association of Data Processing Service Organizations v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 15354 (1970). See, e.g., United States v. Scrap, 412 U.S. 669, 686 (1973).
There are, however, two exceptions to reviewability under the Administrative Procedure
Act. First, if a statute by its terms renders administrative action final, agency action will
normally not be reviewed by a court. 5 U.S.C. § 701 (a)(1) (1976). Second, if agency action is
"committed to agency discretion by law," the action will not be reviewed. 5 U.S.C.
§ 701(a)(2) (1976). At the same time, a reviewing court may "hold unlawful and set aside
agency action. . . found to be. . . arbitary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise
not in accordance with law." 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (1976). The apparent conflict between §
701 and § 706 was resolved in Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402
(1971), where the Supreme Court construed the "committed to agency discretion" exception
to review as "very narrow" and designed only for "those rare instances when 'statutes are
drawn in such broad terms that in a given case there is no law to apply.'" Id. at 410.
94 Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 706(1)-706(2)(A) states in pertinent part:
"The reviewing court shall (1) compel agency action unlawfully withheld or unreasonably
delayed; and (2) hold unlawful and set aside agency action, findings, and conclusions found
to be A) arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with the
law."
Under 5 U.S.C. § 701 (1976), the United States Department of Justice falls within the
scope of the definition of "agency."
95 Id.
96 Bowman Transportation, Inc. v. Arkansas-Best Freight System, Inc., 419 U.S. 281, 285
(1974).
97 See supra note 69 and accompanying text.
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date that the federal government should participate in parental
kidnapping cases expressly refutes the old policy. Congress has made
clear that the provisions of the Federal Kidnapping Act have no relevance as to whether or in what manner a court should use the Fugitive
Felon Act as a jurisdictional basis for federal intervention in parental
kidnapping cases. 98 The "illogical and largely irrelevant" 99 reasoning of
the Justice Department means that an agency may follow old rather
than new policy directives, even if the new policy contradicts and supersedes the old policy. The Department's reasoning thus may subject the
regulations to invalidation under the Administrative Procedure Act's arbitrary and capricious standard. Here, agency discretion has led to the
executive branch enforcing old policy positions and thwarting congressionally mandated reform.
The Justice Department also incorrectly underestimates the seriousness with which the states view the child snatching problem. The Justice Department states that the domestic nature of child snatching
makes the offense less serious than other state felonies and creates too
many enforcement problems to merit the expenditure of Department
resources.l°° To substantiate its argument, the Department claims that
a "significant number of states" classify parental child stealing as a misdemeanor and regard the offense as "quasi-civil." 1'0 One fact, however,
severely weakens this claim: of the fifty- three jurisdictions recently sur02
veyed, thirty-nine have felony child abduction and restraint statutes.1
Moreover; many of these state felony laws are recent enactments which,
in response to the increased incidence of child snatching, permit federal
involvement under the Fugitive Felon Act.' 0 3 Contrary to the Department's position, the majority of states regard child snatching not as a
98 During a Conference Committee before the judiciary Committee of the House of Representatives, the conferees stated:
Section 1073 does not require that some other federal offense be found to form the basis
of federal jurisdiction, nor does it anywhere suggest that the existence of an equivalent
federal offense should be a factor influencing the Attorney General's use of discretion
thereunder. The section itself is the jurisdictional basis.
Domestic Violence Prevention and Services Act: Conference Report Before the HouseJudirzir Comm.
H.R. REP. No. 96-1401, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 42 (1980).
99 Id.

10o See supra text accompanying notes 70-72.
101 See supra text accompanying notes 73-74.
102 See supra note 44.
103 The trend by most states to make child snatching a state felony so that the federal
government may treat the child snatcher under the criminal provisions of the Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act is evidence that states do not view child snatching as "quasi-civil in
nature." For example, in 1981 both Hawaii and New York enacted laws making child
snatching a felony for the expressed purpose of bringing the kidnapping under the provisions
of the federal Act. Id.
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"quasi-civil" or less serious offense but as a serious crime which requires
felony status and federal involvement.
The Justice Department also misunderstood the purpose and effect
of the Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act when it issued its child
snatching regulations. The Department claims that the enforcement of
child snatching laws is difficult due to the existence of conflicting child
custody decrees and the lack of cooperation among state authorities. As
a result, Department officials assert, the FBI's involvement should be
limited due to its probable ineffectiveness. 10 4 These difficulties, however, are precisely the problems Congress enacted the Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act to solve. If the Justice Department, state agencies,
and state courts enforce the Act as Congress intended, all conflicting
custody decrees would be eliminated because all decrees would be
granted full faith and credit. Furthermore, the FBI should be able to
coordinate communication and cooperation among its field offices and
thus entirely avoid uncooperative local authorities.
To justify its regulations, the Justice Department also uses a factually and statistically erroneous argument concerning the Department's
ability to prosecute child snatchers. The Department claims that involvement in child snatching is futile because custodial parents in "repeated instances" drop felony charges before prosecution once they
regain custody of the child.10 5 This argument is inaccurate for two related reasons. First, in cases involving the issuance of a federal warrant,
the normal FBI procedure is to return the individual charged with the
state felony to that state for prosecution by state officials. The Executive
Assistant Director of the FBI has explained that only in "unusual circumstances" will prosecution occur at the federal level.' 0 6 Because the
Department normally will not handle the prosecution, it has no grounds
to complain if custodial parents drop charges.
Moreover, statistics do not support the Department's argument
that its involvement is ineffective due to lack of cooperation from custodial parents. On the contrary, a recent study indicates that in only five
percent of the child snatching cases which did not reach prosecution was
the dismissal due to a custodial parent's failure to request or cooperate
10 7
in the prosecution.
The Justice Department puts forth another unsubstantiated argument to justify restricting its involvement in child snatching cases. It
claims that, because its agents do not have the expertise to handle doSee supra text accompanying note 76.
105 Id.
106 Kidnapping Hearings, supra note 1, at 42.
107 Id. at 61, 83. The study examined 91 cases of child snatching in Los Angeles. Of these,
41 were not prosecuted for the following reasons:
104
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mestic relations disputes, they could inflict additional emotional trauma
and violence when they attempt to rescue the child. 108 While it is true
that FBI agents, unlike state officials, do not receive training in domestic
relations disputes, they do receive special training in dealing with kidnap victims.' 0 9 Furthermore, as the Acting Deputy Attorney General
admitted in testimony before the Subcommittee on Criminal Law, the
Department has no basis for assuming that a federal officer's arrest creates more trauma for a child than an arrest by a state law enforcement
officer. 1H0
The Justice Department's inaccurate and arbitrary arguments in
support of its child snatching regulations demonstrates that a "rational
connection between the facts found and the choice made" does not exist.
If the Justice Department only advanced the five arguments discussed in
this section as support for its regulations, a reviewing court might invalidate the regulations under the Adminstrative Procedure Act's arbitrary
and capricious standard.
The Justice Department, however, also strongly argues that its restrictive enforcement of the Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act is necessary because full enforcement of the Act would seriously deplete
Justice Department resources."' The regulations avoid routine federal
involvement in child custody cases which "would divert the FBI's limREASON
Incomplete Evidence
Dismissed-Interest of Justice
Misdemeanor Referral-17b (4)
Victim Requests no Prosecution/Uncooperative

NUMBER
13

PERCENT
32%

8

20

13

32

2

5

Other
5
12
101%a
41
Total
a = error due to rounding
Kidnapping Hearings, supra note 1, at 76, 83.
108 See supra text accompanying note 75.
109 THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT MANUAL, supra note 45, at 344.
110 Kidnapping Hearings, supra note 1, at 29.
111 Justice Department officials are uncertain, however, as to the effect of the Parental
Kidnapping Prevention Act on their resources. For example, the Executive Assistant Director
of the FBI commented that:
Our experience in fugitive-type investigations leads us to expect that approximately 160
additional agents would be needed to investigate 5,000 parental kidnapping matters.
Additional supervisory personnel, support personnel, would also be needed, and of
course, additional operating expenses would be incurred for both visitation denial and
parental kidnapping cases.
KidnappingHearings,supranote 1, at 26-27 (statement of Lee Colwell). However, in a separate
publication, the same spokesperson said that the bill would force his agency to hire only 60
additional agents, plus support personnel. Pick, supra note 2, at 54-55.
A custodial parent who was denied assistance by the FBI testified to an interesting use of
the Bureau's "limited resources." Rather than use the resources to help a mother locate her
missing child, the FBI went to much trouble to compile a voluminous file on her - the legal
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ited resources away from fugitive cases involving violent criminals, organized crime, white collar crime, and public corruption,"'1 2 crimes
which the Department views as having higher priority than child
snatching.
At first glance, the Department's position appears rational. It invokes the traditional doctrine of prosecutorial discretion, a doctrine
which courts have not sought to curb in criminal cases."t 3 Courts have
recognized that legislatures grant law enforcement agencies broad discretionary powers to initiate enforcement proceedings against offenders.'1 4 On the civil side as well, courts traditionally have deferred to an
agency's judgment as to how it develops an enforcement policy best calczstodian of the child. These efforts included opening her mail and tapping her phone. Child
Snatching Hearings, supra note 3, at 27.
112 7 FAM. L. REP. (BNA) 2739, 2741 (Oct. 6, 1981). Paul Michel testified that resources
are "not only limited, but over recent years have been shrinking. There are fewer FBI agents
today than there were 3 or 4 years ago." KidnappingHearings, supra note 1,at 23.
113 Note, Reviewabilit of ProsecutorialDiscretion: Failureto Prosecute, 75 COLUM. L. REv. 130,
141 (1975). In Inmates of Attica Correctional Facility v. Rockefeller, 477 F.2d 375 (2d Cir.
1973), the court explained that "federal courts have traditionally, and to our knowledge,
uniformly refrained from overturning, at the instance of a private person, discretionary decisions of federal prosecuting authorities not to prosecute persons regarding whom a complaint
of criminal conduct is made." Id. at 379. "The primary ground upon which this traditional
judicial aversion to compelling prosecutions has been based is the separation of powers doctrine" which prevents courts from interfering with a prosecutor's discretionary powers because he is an official of the executive branch of the government. Id. at 379-80. The court
also emphasized that judicial supervision through litigation would require disclosure of confidential information, and a court is not in a position to determine how an agency should
allocate limited personnel and facilities in decisions to pick strong rather than weak cases to
prosecute. The court said that "we believe that substitution of a court's decision to compel
prosecution for the U.S. Attorney's decision not to prosecute, even upon an abuse of discretion standard of review and even if limited to directing that a prosecution be undertaken in
good faith . . . would be unwise." Id. at 380-81. Professor Davis, however, has argued that
"the assumptions on which prosecutors' uncontrolled discretion is founded are in need of
reexamination. . . that a full study of the prosecuting power is likely to produce a movement
in the direction of greater control of discretion, through more confinement, more structuring,
more checks, and more procedural protections." K. DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE: A
PRELIMINARY INQUIRY 198 (1969). He argues that a prosecutor's discretion should be more
structured by the issuance of rules indicating how discretion is to be exercised. K. DAVIs,
POLICE DISCRETION (1975). Ironically, the FBI's regulations issued for child snatching cases
fulfills Davis' published guideline requirement. However, these guidelines are in contravention of Congress' "guidelines" that mandate the issuance of warrants in all child snatching
cases where there is probable cause to suspect that a noncustodial parent has snatched the
child. In essence, because Congress has limited FBI discretion to the determination of probable cause, the FBI's exercise of its discretion through the regulations that it has promulgated
is beyond its power. The FBI simply has no power ofprosecutorial discretion to exercise here.
Cases such as Inmates of Attica are therefore inapposite.
114 Note, supra note 113, at 141-43. Courts in the past have held that decisions not to
prosecute were not subject to judicial review. See, e.g., Procter & Gamble Co. v. United
States, 225 U.S. 282, 293 (1912). For the most part, however, the courts have abandoned this
inflexible position. The issue now is whether decisions not to prosecute "bear the degree of
finality and formality necessary to constitute 'final orders' within the meaning of the review
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culated to achieve the ends the legislature intended. 15 Additionally,
courts have emphasized that an agency is in the best position to set its
own agenda and allocate its funds and personnel in order to execute a
legislative policy most efficiently.'" 6 Nonetheless, where an agency exercises its enforcement discretion in a way that is contrary to the intent of
Congress, the agency's action is arbitrary and beyond its power." 7 The
Supreme Court has declared that an agency cannot assume the power of
repeal reserved in the Congress, by exercising its enforcement discretion
contrary to congressional intent.II
Because the Justice Department's regulations establishing its enforcement policy are contrary to the congressional directive that fugitive
warrants issue in all child snatching cases regardless of the existence of
cause to believe that a child is in physical danger or abused, courts
provision of the organic statute." Note, Reviewability of rosecutorialDiscretion: Failureto Prosecute, 75 COLUM. L. REV. 130, 135 (1975).
Nevertheless a significant number of cases still hold that agency actions based upon
prosecutorial discretion are not reviewable. See Russell v. Parratt, 543 F.2d 1214, 1216 (8th
Cir. 1976) (allowing "unbridled" discretion of a prosecutor to decide whether to prosecute a
17-year-old as an adult because "we have simply a traditional exercise of discretion within the
executive branch" and because of "the long and widely accepted concept of prosecutorial
discretion, which derives from the constitutional principle of separation of powers."); Newman v. United States, 382 F.2d 479, 482 (D.C. Cir. 1967) ("[Ilt is not the function of the
judiciary to review the exercise of executive discretion whether it be that of the President
himself or those to whom he has delegated certain of his powers."); United States v. Cox, 342
F.2d 167, 171 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 381 U.S. 935 (1965) ("it is as an officer of the executive
department that [the United States attorney] exercises a discretion as to whether there shall
be a prosecution in a particular case. It follows, as an incident of the constitutional separation of powers, that the courts are not to interfere with the free exercise of the discretionary
powers of the attorneys of the United States in their control over criminal prosecutions.').
Several courts have explicitly refused to review an agency's decision not to prosecute if it
is based upon economic considerations. See Payton v. United States, 468 F. Supp. 651, 653
(S.D. Ala. 1979); United States v. Panza, 381 F. Supp. 1133, 1137 (W.D. Pa. 1974); Pugach v.
Klein, 193 F. Supp. 630, 635 (S.D.N.Y. 1961). But see Adams v. Richardson, 480 F.2d 1159
(D.C. Cir. 1973) (lack of resources does not justify selectivity in enforcement of the law when
full enforcement would not dilute the resources of the pertinent agency). See Note, supra note
113, at 144.
The Justice Department's inconsistent remarks on the impact of the Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act on Department resources, see supra note 111, undermines the validity of
the Department's economic argument against prosecuting certain cases.
The legislative history of the Administrative Procedure Act also indicates that additional
cost will not always justify the exercise of prosecutorial discretion to avoid prosecution. The
Senate Report states that the Act "must reasonably protect private parties even at the risk of
some incidental or possible inconvenience to or change in present administrative operations."
S. Doe. No. 248, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 191 (1946).
115 See, e.g., Moog Industries, Inc. v. FTC, 355 U.S. 411 (1958). See Dunlop v. Bachowski,
421 U.S. 560 (1975).
116 See, e.g., Southern Railway Co. v. Seaboard Allied Milling Corp., 442 U.S. 444 (1979).
117 See, e.g., Office Employees International Union Local No. 11, AFL-CIO v. Labor
Board, 353 U.S. 313 (1957).
118 Id. at 318-20.
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should invalidate the regulations and compel the FBI to act. Despite
traditional court deference to agency discretion in criminal cases, this is
one case where Congress has circumscribed the Justice Department's
role. The FBI has discretion to decide only whether there is probable
cause to believe that a child snatching has occurred, not whether there is
probable cause to believe that the kidnapper is endangering, abusing, or
neglecting the child. By exempting an entire class of individuals those custodial parents who have children snatched from them but cannot demonstrate a clear and present danger of bodily harm to their children - from the purview of the Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act,
the Justice Department has issued entirely arbitrary regulations. For
the Act to achieve its salutary purpose, the regulations must not survive
and the FBI must act in a way consistent with the intent of Congress.
Otherwise, the FBI will retain its illegal power of legislative repeal.1 19
Although critics1 20 of the broad discretionary powers granted to
law enforcement officials would probably applaud this approach, a private action brought under the Administrative Procedure Act suffers
from one severe drawback: parents will incur potentially prohibitive legal costs if they challenge the regulations. Under the Administrative
Procedure Act, the scope of judicial review does not include monetary
relief.12 1 Although private parties may collect legal fees as part of their
award, the uncertainty surrounding the amount of fees awarded, the
uncertain chances of success, and the large expenses that accompany a
major lawsuit, serve to discourage parents from bringing a private suit
challenging the Justice Department regulations. It is therefore unfortunate that these suits may be essential to enforcing the strong congressional policy against child snatching.
VII.

CONCLUSION

Following the enactment of the Parental Kidnapping Prevention
Act, a conflict developed between Congress and the Justice Department
as to how to enforce the Act. The fact that executive agencies enjoy
119 If Congress defeats the pending legislation on child snatching, a court may conclude
that the intent of Congress has changed and now supports the Justice Department's position.
The same result would follow if Congress had not taken any action in the face of the Justice
Department's regulations. In Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1, 11 (1965), the Supreme Court noted
that "Congress' failure to repeal or revise in the face of [an] administrative interpretation has
been held to constitute persuasive evidence that that interpretation is the one intended by
Congress."
120 See generaly K. DAViS, supra note 113; Bubany & Skillern, Taming the Dragon: An Adminirtrative Law for ProsecutorialDecisionMaking, 13 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 473 (1976); Cox, Prosecutorial
Discretion: An Overview, 13 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 383 (1976); Vorenberg, Narrowing the Discretion
of Crimina/JusticeOfcials, 1976 DUKE L.J. 651.
121 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1976).

1982]

PARENTAL KIDNAPPING PREVENTION ACT

1203

only limited and well-defined legislative powers aids in resolution of this
conflict. Although legally restricted to promulgating regulations consistent with congressional intent, the Justice Department, nonetheless, has
exceeded this limit through the issuance of regulations contrary to the
express wording of the congressional statute and its legislative history.
Recognition of an agency's incorrect application of the law, however,
does not automatically result in reform. Either the courts or Congress
must take affirmative action to correct the Justice Department's interpretation if the congressional mandate to halt child snatching is to prevail. Until then, the federal response to child snatching will continue to
be ineffective and primary responsibility for the enforcement of child
snatching laws will remain with the states. The proven inadequacy of
state enforcement ensures that until federal enforcement becomes effective, the instances of child snatching will continue to proliferate.
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